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Why Transparency Undermines Economy 
 
This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Synthese. 
 
Abstract 
Alex Byrne (2005; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c and 2012) offers a novel interpretation of 
the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s 
own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his (2011c and 
2012) attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the 
theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account.  The 
paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of 
self-knowledge must address.1 
 
1.  Introduction 
How do we know the contents of our own minds?  One answer is that our own minds 
are transparent to us; we know simply by inquiring about the world (Evans 1982).  I can 
treat the question ‘Do I believe that p?’ as equivalent to the question whether p, and by 
treating the two questions as equivalent, I am almost guaranteed to answer to the first 
question correctly. 
 Alexander Byrne (2005 and 2011a) has argued for a particular elaboration of 
transparency, according to which we know our own minds through an inference rule.  All 
of us (or at least all normal humans) reason according to the following principle: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thanks to Colin Klein, Tristram McPherson, Jack Woods, and the two anonymous referees for 
discussion, criticism, and helpful advice.  The research in this paper was substantially funded by a 
grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China 
(Project No. LU342612).  Ideas in this paper were partly developed while visiting The Australia 
National University, especially thanks to discussions on the problem of self-knowledge with Ryan 
Cox and Daniel Stoljar.	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BEL: If p, then believe that you believe that p! 
 
Now this principle may seem dubious—I do not believe everything that is the case—but 
Byrne points out that using it is guaranteed to produce true conclusions anyway. My 
premises must be the propositions I believe.  Byrne thus calls the principle “strongly self-
verifying.”  Because the principle is strongly self-verifying, conclusions reached on its 
basis are justified; they count as knowledge. 
 The problem is that transparency looks most plausible when we focus on one 
particular attitude, belief.  A person’s beliefs are her picture of what the world is like, and 
so it is reasonable that we could know them by asking ourselves what the world is like.  
But optical illusions can persist despite our better knowledge, and thus we cannot know 
how these illusions appear to us by asking ourselves how the world is—since the world 
visually appears to us other than the way that, as far as we are concerned, the world is.  
Intentions, for their part, seem to have the role of changing the world, rather than 
representing the way the world is (cf. Anscombe 1957;  and Humberstone 1992) 
 In his (2011c) Byrne offers an extension of this inferentialist account to 
knowledge of one’s own intentions; and in his (2012), Byrne offers a similar extension 
for knowledge of one’s own sensory experiences.  If his arguments are successful, then 
his inferentialist version of transparency begins to look extremely credible as a general 
explanation of the possibility of self-knowledge.  The primary virtue of his account is its 
theoretical simplicity.  As he puts it: 
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…[T]he transparency account is economical: it explains self-knowledge in 
terms of epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for other 
subject matters. (2012: 207) 
 
In other words, this account explains how people can know their own mental states 
without positing any special capacities of self-knowledge (as in Lycan 1996), and without 
making self-knowledge radically discontinuous with other forms of knowledge (as in 
McGeer 1996; Moran 2001; Boyle 2011; and arguably Valaris 2014). At the same time, it 
does not make knowledge of one’s mental states essentially third-personal, so that one 
infers what one thinks on the basis of one’s behavior (cf. Carruthers 2013).  It preserves, 
on the one hand, the idea that one’s epistemic access to one’s own mental states is 
privileged; at the same time, all that people need for this privileged knowledge is 
capacities for knowing the external world, plus inference rules. 
 Byrne’s account has been criticized on the grounds that those supposedly 
utilizing the inference rules would regard them as fallacious—anyone with enough sense 
to recognize her own fallibility does not think that it follows from the truth of p that she 
believes p—and this casts doubt on whether a person disposed to believe that she 
believes that p whenever she believes that p is engaged in a process rational enough to be 
regarded as genuine inference (cf. Boyle 2011; Moran 2012; and Shoemaker 2012; also 
see Valaris 2011).  More recently, Lauren Ashwell (2013) has argued that Byrne’s (2011b) 
account fails as an explanation of knowledge of one’s own desires—and only succeeds if 
we supplement his theory with commitments that undermine its claim to theoretical 
economy. 
This paper continues the second line of argument with respect to his account of 
intention; in the case of perception, on the other hand, it argues that Byrne has already 
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taken on commitments incompatible with the goal of economy.  Thus, while his attempts 
to extend the account to perception and intention are ingenious, they rob the account of 
any claim it might have to theoretical economy, the virtue that was supposed to draw us 
to inferentialism in the first place.  These two objections will illustrate challenges for 
transparency-based accounts of self-knowledge more generally. 
 
2. Knowledge of Perception 
How does Byrne’s account apply to perception?  We start with the assumption that the 
content of perception is propositional.  I see that a chair is a few feet in front of me; I smell 
that coffee is brewing.  Byrne makes a further claim about the content of perception: each 
perceptual mode takes for its content a special class of proposition, one appropriate to 
the modality.  So the content of visual perception is a visual proposition (or v-proposition), 
whereas smell takes for its content olfactory propositions (or o-propositions), touch takes 
tactile propositions, and so on (2012: 197-201). 
 Byrne only provides a detailed account of vision and its relation to v-
propositions, though presumably the relation other senses bear to their respective 
contents will be analogous.  For Byrne, propositions in general can be thought of as ways 
that the world can be.  V-propositions, then, are ways that the world can be with respect to 
its visible objects and properties, whereas o-propositions are ways that the world can be 
with respect to objects and properties detectable through smell.  It is important to 
emphasize that the propositions in both cases are not specifically visual or olfactory 
representations of how the world can be; rather, they are what visual or olfactory experience 
represents—they are the ways the world can be, specified with respect to those 
properties accessible to the relevant modality.  Byrne is explicit that vision, for example, 
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represents “v-facts” (2012: 199-200).2  The theoretical importance of this commitment 
will become clear momentarily; for now it is enough to note that this is a standard 
commitment about the nature of propositions. 
 The other distinguishing characteristic of v-propositions is complexity.  A visual 
perception of a green leaf, or a silver spoon, or a yellow taxicab presents us with vastly 
more information about the hue, shade, and spatial relations among the visible parts of 
the object than we can express in language.  A picture is worth a thousand words, and 
then some: 
 
…[G]iving a theoretically satisfying characterization of v-facts is difficult.  
…Complexity or informational richness is no doubt part of the story, but 
even in the case of viewing a very simple scene—say, a red spot against a 
grey background—it is unclear just how to proceed.  Just concentrating 
on one feature of the spot, its hue, the predicate ‘is red’ (or even some 
made-up predicate like ‘is red29’) does not quite do it justice.  The 
particular red hue of the spot might be a little yellowish, or alternately a 
little bluish… (2012: 199-200) 
 
If we think of propositions as sets of possible worlds, we can treat v-propositions as sets 
formed by partitioning possible worlds solely on the basis of visible differences.  These 
visibility-based partitions must be more fine-grained, however, than the partitions that 
can be expressed in natural language, or than can be made in ordinary belief (visual 
beliefs will be dealt with in a moment). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Vision, we may say, reveals the visual world: the world of v-facts.  In the visual world things are 
colored, illuminated, moving, and so on, but not smelly or noisy” (2012: 200).  Byrne goes on to add: 
“Vision is, at least in creatures like us, an exclusive conduit for v-facts” (ibid.). 
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 While Byrne does not pursue this option, it’s worth noting his v-propositions 
could be given a Fregean gloss as well (though a commitment to Fregeanism may sit 
poorly with his ultimate aim of theoretical economy).3  In this case, the distinguishing 
feature of such propositions is not that they are ways the world could be with respect to 
visible properties, but that they are ways the world could be under a visual mode of presentation 
(Chalmers 2006).  On the former understanding of v-propositions, the visual experience 
that the taxicab is yellow and the belief that the taxicab is yellow have different contents, 
because the visual experience takes for its content a subset of the set of possibilities that 
make up the belief.  On the latter understanding, the contents differ in roughly the same 
way that the contents of that belief that x is Hesperus and the belief that x is Phosphorus 
differ: the contents are composed of different senses (or something very similar to senses), 
even if they have a common referent. 
 Either interpretation of v-propositions raises questions, though, about the 
relation of my seeing that the taxicab is yellow with my ordinary, assertible belief that the 
taxicab is yellow.  While Byrne does not spell out the exact relation of v-propositions to 
other propositions, we can extrapolate the following from his above commitments along 
with other arguments he goes on to make.  I will use pV to name visual propositions, 
whereas non-visual propositions will simply be identified as p.  The v-proposition the-
taxicab-is-yellowV entails the-taxicab-is-yellow.  The first proposition will pick out some much 
more specific way that the taxicab is yellow and will presumably include additional visible 
properties of the taxi, such as the shape of the chassis.  Thus, if that proposition is true, 
the non-visual proposition must be true as well.4  There is still a question of how the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this, as well as noting the problem it might raise for 
the theory’s parsimony. 
4 These points will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions. 
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perception with the first proposition as content justifies one’s belief in the second—but a 
number of answers are consistent with the picture sketched out here. 
With the v-proposition, Byrne can construct inference rules by means of which 
we know our visual experiences (2012: 199): 
 
SEE: If pV then believe that you see that pV! 
 
In other words, one takes the world to be some visibly accessible way of sufficient visible 
complexity, and concludes on that basis that one sees the world to be such a visibly 
accessible, complex way.  Similar rules could be offered for the other sense modalities. 
 With SEE in place, we can see why Byrne is committed to his various claims 
about v-propositions. Something must distinguish them from non-v-propositions, 
otherwise I will apply SEE to every proposition I believe, and so conclude that I see that 
Henry VIII had six wives.  At the same time, Byrne’s inferentialist account of self-
knowledge is supposed to be a more precise way of capturing the idea that the mind is 
transparent, and that one knows one’s mind by looking out at the world.  This rules out 
identifying v-propositions with specifically visual ways of encoding information, or 
specifically visual ways of representing the world.  Imagine this were not the case.  Then, 
for any given proposition p which I held true, to know whether I should conclude that I 
see that p on its basis—that is, to know whether it could serve as a premise in SEE—I 
would first have to identify how I was representing p.  But this would mean that 
application of the inference rule required prior identification of what sort of 
representational states I was in.  Byrne thus identifies v-propositions a particular 
subclass, not of ways the world could be represented, but simply of the ways that it could 
be—in particular, ways that its visible properties and objects could be. 
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 But I may have been blinded, yet believe that there is a brown cow standing in 
front of me thanks to a friend’s report.  If SEE told me to infer that I see a brown cow 
in such a situation, it would not be strongly self-verifying.  Byrne’s appeal to the 
complexity of visual propositions is meant to prevent such inferences.  Restricted to 
these propositions, SEE, is a practically self-verifying principle: if an introspecting subject 
had access to “the—as-yet-unwritten—language of vision” application of SEE would 
result in false conclusions; but in all ordinary situations these inferences will generate 
truth (2012: 201). 
Byrne could likely offer a simpler solution to the difficulties listed above by 
endorsing the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions suggested earlier, though at some 
cost to the theory’s advertised parsimony.  But keep in mind that even with this Fregean 
account, the ban on treating v-propositions as visual representations would remain in 
effect, on pain of abandoning transparency altogether.5 
 
3. The First Objection 
According to Byrne, if you see that pV, you must also believe that pV (2012: 205-6).  This 
is required by the inferentialist picture.  To conclude, on the basis of SEE, that I see that 
pV, I must accept the truth of the premise, pV, at least if my act of concluding is itself 
supposed to take the form of a belief.  Believing the conclusion simply on the basis of, 
for example, entertaining the premise or desiring it would not be an inference, whatever it 
was.  But if I accept the truth of pV, I believe pV.
6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Also on pain of abandoning Fregeanism about visual content; see, for example (Chalmers 2006: 
172). 
6 Note that this does not in any way contradict or presume to answer Valaris’s (2011) objection to 
Byrne: that inference rules should work just as well in hypothetical or suppositional reasoning as in 
categorical reasoning.  Presumably, Valaris would agree that if I am engaged in hypothetical reasoning, 
and so do not believe the premise, I need not believe the conclusion.  The problem for Byrne which 
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A consequence of this is that if I know myself to be experiencing an optical 
illusion, I must have inconsistent beliefs (2012: 206).  I see the Müller-Lyer lines and, 
being familiar with them, know them to be of equal length.  But the illusion persists, so I 
also believe them to be of unequal length, or I believe a more complex v-proposition that 
entails that they are of unequal length.  But there is nothing irrational about experiencing 
a persistent optical illusion. 
It’s natural to think that the Fregean interpretation of v-propositions would help.  
After all, one of the great advantages of Fregeanism is that it explains simply how beliefs 
with incompatible truth-conditions (e.g., Hesperus is visible in the evening and Phosphorus is not 
visible in the evening) can be jointly held without irrationality.  This does not help with the 
victim of a persistent optical illusion, however, at least not in those cases in which she 
herself regards the visual experience as illusory.  Even if we grant a Fregean interpretation, 
the consciously illuded subject would be at best like the person who believes Hesperus is 
visible in the evening, believes Phosphorus is not visible in the evening, but also believes that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus; or she would be like someone who believes Phosphorus is not visible in 
the evening while simultaneously believing that belief of mine about Phosphorus is false.  Byrne’s 
commitment to the irrationality of consciously illuded subjects seems unavoidable. 
In response to this objection, Byrne writes: 
 
It will not do simply to claim that the illuded subject is not, or need not 
be, irrational.  Taken as a claim about a rational ideal, its truth is not 
evident.  Taken as an ordinary sort of remark, on the other hand, it is 
true but not in conflict with belief-dependence [of perception].  The 
belief that the subject knows to be false (e.g., a certain v-proposition that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Valaris identifies is that if I assume for the sake of argument that it is raining, it does not seem that I 
need to assume for the sake of argument that I believe it is raining. 
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is true only if the lines are unequal) does not influence her verbal reports 
about the lengths of the lines, or any plans for action based on the 
lengths of the lines.  She is not therefore ‘irrational’ in the practical sense 
of an ordinary accusation of irrationality. … (2012: fn. 38) 
 
Byrne’s position is thus that the subject of persistent optical illusion may be irrational in 
the strict sense, but we do not ordinarily think of her as so, because her belief in the 
relevant v-proposition is effectively partitioned off from the rest of her beliefs. 
How does this partitioning work?  On the one hand, the belief survives the 
judgment that it is false.  Byrne compares this with the modularity that delusional beliefs 
may enjoy—often surviving a person’s recognition of their delusional status (2012: 206).  
At the same time, Byrne explicitly states that the belief in question will not be expressed 
in assertions or bring about intentions.  Presumably the agent will also refrain from 
drawing inferences on its basis: since the v-proposition the agent believes contradicts 
another proposition she believes, application of standard inference rules would lead to 
explosion in her beliefs.  Furthermore, the requirement that she not form intentions on 
the basis of the belief will only be met if she does not draw inferences on its basis (or 
those inferences are themselves partitioned).  The partitioning, then, comes on both 
sides: the belief does not respond to its standard inputs, such as the belief that it is false, 
nor does it have any of the standard outputs: assertions, intentions, or further beliefs. 
 One obvious and troubling consequence is that the belief does not seem to play 
the functional role of a belief.  It is a very standard commitment, however, that a given 
attitude-type possesses its functional properties necessarily.  (Note that this is weaker 
than functionalism about mental states; it does not claim that mental states are functional 
states, that they have their particular mental properties in virtue of their functional 
properties, or that functional properties are sufficient to determine mental properties—it 
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simply claims that some state is, for example, a belief only if it has the functional 
properties of a belief.)7 
 If Byrne wishes to avoid a highly revisionary ontology of mental states, then, he 
must think that the functional properties are masked rather than missing.  Some evidence 
that this is his position is suggested by this argument in favor of identifying perceptual 
states with beliefs: 
 
…[P]resumably some animals with visual systems very similar to ours 
(some other primates, say), cannot cognitively override visual illusions: in 
this sense, for them, seeing is always believing.  Belief is thus built into 
their visual systems.  And since we have basically the same visual systems, 
seeing is believing for us too. (2012: 205) 
 
Now the fact that certain primates cannot override the deliverances of their visual 
systems, whereas humans can, might suggest that those deliverances play different 
functional roles in the two kinds of psychologies.  But Byrne’s idea seems to be that 
perceptual states had the functional role of beliefs in distant evolutionary ancestors, and 
that this gives some reason to think that the appropriate functional properties are still 
latent in our perceptual states. 
Byrne can insist then that visual states have the functional properties of beliefs, 
holding only that these properties fail, for some reason, to manifest.  He can insist that 
the relevant functions are masked rather than absent altogether.  I don’t wish to claim that 
this is an unreasonable position.  What is objectionable, rather, is that no independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The claim could even be further weakened: to be a belief a state must have most or enough of the 
functional properties of belief.  The concern is that Byrne’s perceptual beliefs have near to none. 
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justification for this interpretation rather than the rival has been provided—that is, he 
has not provided any independent reason why we should regard visual states in adult 
humans as possessing “belief-y” dispositions that are masked, as opposed to lacking the 
dispositions altogether.  (His point that “we have basically the same visual systems” is a 
non-sequitur in this context; the question is whether those visual systems play the same 
functional role in our psychologies—and if we can cognitively override their deliverances, 
there is substantial reason to think not.)  But this is to say that Byrne’s account depends 
on a contentious metaphysical commitment, which one would have no reason otherwise 
to make, and that is exactly the sort of thing that makes theories uneconomical. 
 This leads to the basic problem with Byrne’s account: the proposed partitioning 
of the belief is extraordinarily ad hoc, especially in its details.  To begin with, Byrne has 
proposed the existence of a belief that does not go away even after its possessor judges it 
false, simply because that is what his theory demands.  There is no independent reason to 
accept the presence of such beliefs.  The belief must also be partitioned, so that its 
possessor does not assert, intend, or infer on its basis.  But again, the only reason to 
accept such a partitioning is to answer evidence that appears to disconfirm the theory—
namely, that people do not act or reason as though they had such beliefs.  This is already 
objectionably ad hoc.  There is also the question of why such extensive partitioning does 
not undermine the state’s status as a belief.  Byrne is correct that partitioning may merely 
mask the relevant functional properties rather than eliminating them.  But to go further 
and say that this is so is to insist on a particular thesis about the metaphysics of 
dispositions and functional properties in the absence of any argument in its favor—other 
than that is what inferentialism demands.  Even more striking, however, is that the 
partitioning is not absolute.  There will be one exception to the general walling-off of the 
illusional-belief with respect to inferences: the illuded subject will still apply inference 
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rule SEE to it.  In other words, the one exception to this general partitioning is, by 
remarkable coincidence, the one required for the theory of self-knowledge to work in the 
first place.  Even more remarkably, this pattern will be repeated, with the exact 
appropriate exemption, for the beliefs of every sense modality.8 
 The main case Byrne offers in favor of his inferentialist account of self-
knowledge is, as he puts, economy.  But this economical epistemology is purchased 
through profligacy in the theory of mind: with ad hoc partitionings, further ad hoc 
exemptions to those same partitionings, and ad hoc commitments on the metaphysics of 
functional properties.  So the theory has not really achieved any sort of theoretical 




A transparency-based account of knowledge of one’s intentions must identify some fact 
about how the world is, from the agent’s point of view, which indicates to the agent what 
it is that he or she intends.  In the case of Byrne’s inferentialist account, this means the 
relevant inference rule must specify the type of proposition that can serve as premise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A referee wonders if Byrne’s partitionings are really that ad hoc.  After all, we know the visual system 
to be relatively encapsulated.  Couldn’t Byrne explain the specific partitioning of visual beliefs in 
terms of this general encapsulation of the visual system?  Possibly, but this would still fail to address 
two of the key ways in which the account is ad hoc.  First, why don’t these partitionings undermine the 
state’s status as a belief?  If Byrne wishes to say that it still manifests enough of the functional 
properties to count as a belief, the burden is on him to state what these manifestations are, given his 
claim that the state “does not influence [the illuded subject’s] verbal reports about the lengths of the 
lines, or any plans for action based on the lengths of the lines.”  On the other hand, if Byrne grants 
(as he seems to) that the manifestations are lacking, he must explain why we should regard the 
functional properties as present, but masked or otherwise latent, rather than absent altogether.  To 
insist on masking without independent grounds is ad hoc.  Second, he must offer some independent 
grounds why SEE would be an exception to the visual system’s general encapsulation.  At present, 
nothing has been offered, and the only justification seems to be that inferentialism requires that it is 
so. 
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 One obvious answer is that I determine what I intend to do by looking out at the 
world and figuring out what I have most reason to do (cf. Moran 2001).  This might lead 
us to an inference rule such as: 
 
OUGHT: If you ought to ϕ, believe that you intend to ϕ! 
 
But such a principle could not be self-verifying, since we can be akratic (2011c: 214).  
What’s more, there will be situations in which the reasons are neutral between several 
options, but in situations such as these, we still know which of the several acceptable 
options is the one we actually intend (Way 2007).  Consequently, Byrne rejects the idea 
that we know our intentions by knowing those normative facts that would justify the 
intended action.  Instead, he argues that when a person intends to ϕ she also believes that 
she will ϕ.  A person thus knows her intentions on the basis of her belief that she will 
perform the intended action (2011c: 215ff.). 
We need, then, a way to distinguish mere predictions about what one will do in 
the future from intentions.  (I may predict that I will eat too much cake at the party 
because I always do, without intending to eat so much cake.)  So Byrne restricts the 
application of the inference rule to those cases in which the prediction is not based on 
evidence.  He writes: 
 
I know that I am going to fail the exam because I know that I am poorly 
prepared; I know that I will be wearing down my sneakers because I 
know that I will be wearing them when I run the marathon. That is, I 
know on the basis of evidence that I will fail the exam and wear down 
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my sneakers. 
 
However, as Anscombe points out, sometimes one’s knowledge of what 
one will do is not arrived at by these familiar means. … [T]hose present 
and future actions that can be known ‘without observation’ are those that 
one intends to perform: if I know without observation that I will fail the 
exam, I intend to fail the exam; if I know without observation that I will 
run in the marathon tomorrow, I intend to run in the marathon 
tomorrow. (2011c: 218) 
 
Byrne adds that Anscombe’s phrase “knowledge without observation” is not strictly 
speaking accurate, and offers the replacement “knowledge not resting on evidence” 
(ibid.).  So we know our intentions on the basis of our beliefs about what we will do in 
the future, along with the fact that these beliefs are not based on evidence. 
 The actual inference rule offered by Byrne does not mention anything about 
evidence, however; this rule, which he calls the “bouletic schema,” takes the following 
simple form: 
 
I will φ 
____________ 
I intend to φ 
(2011c: 216) 
 
The restriction to cases in which belief in the premise is not based on evidence is 
presented in terms of conditions in which the bouletic schema is defeasible.  Byrne writes: 
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“One will not reason in accord with the bouletic schema if one believes that one’s belief 
that one will φ rests on good evidence that one will φ” (2011c: 218). 
 Once again, Byrne argues this rule, given awareness of the defeating conditions, will be 
practically strongly self-verifying: 
 
Privileged access is explained because the bouletic schema is practically 
strongly self-verifying: for the most part, if one reasons in accord with 
the schema (and is mindful of defeating conditions, for instance the one 
just noted), then one will arrive at a true belief about one’s intention. 
(2011c: 219) 
 
So we are now owed an account of how we are able to mind those defeating conditions. 
 
5. The Second Objection 
I can have evidence that p and believe that p, and yet fail to believe that p on the basis of 
evidence.  I may have good evidence that lowering taxes would reduce unemployment; 
but the actual basis of my belief may simply be my desire to pay less in taxes.  
Consequently, there are two ways of specifying Byrne’s defeating condition.  Byrne could 
hold that a person should refrain from reasoning according to the bouletic schema when 
she believes she has sufficient evidence for her belief that she will φ; or he could hold 
that a person should refrain from reasoning in according with the bouletic schema when 
she believes that her belief that she will φ is based on sufficient evidence that she will φ. 
 Consider the first interpretation: the mere presence of sufficient evidence that I 
will φ makes the judgment that I intend to φ unwarranted.  But for most of the actions I 
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intend, I will have sufficient evidence that I will perform the action.  Most of my actions 
are not akratic, however it may sometimes feel.  So most of the time, if I intend to φ, I 
believe the reasons favor φ-ing.  Since I know myself to be rational for the most part, if I 
believe that the reasons favor φ-ing, I must think there is good evidence that I will φ.  
What, after all, would a generally rational person do? 
  Even if we agree not to count evidence on the basis of perceived reasons (for 
the sake of argument—the author has a hard time seeing any justification), inductive 
evidence often surrounds our intentions—we are predictable creatures.  Two akratics 
could have the same evidence (the same track record of failure), and each could believe 
of himself that he will eat too much cake at the party (cf. Ashwell 2013: 253ff).  But one 
could also know himself not to currently intend to eat so much, though he knows such 
an intention will form at some point after his arrival; whereas the other could know 
himself to be already akratically intending the impending gluttony.  But if their evidence 
is the same, there must be some explanation why it defeats the inference in the first case 
but not the second. 
 This takes us to the second interpretation, which would allow us to 
accommodate the two akratics and the other cases as well.  But now if we are to be 
“mindful of the defeating conditions” we must know not only what we believe, but why 
we believe it.  We must know that we have the belief because of that evidential support.  
But that requires we know, not only what our beliefs are, but, for example, what causal 
relations hold between our beliefs.  Or, if one is unhappy with causal accounts of 
believing for a reason, we must know some other relation to hold between the beliefs: 
the counterfactuals under which we would and would not continue to hold the beliefs, or 
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which primitive relations of believing on the basis of hold among our beliefs.  Whatever the 
precise relation, we are entitled to ask how we know that. 
 Even independently of Byrne’s story about intention, it seems to be part of 
common sense that people generally know not just what they believe, but why they 
believe it.  Of course, in individual cases we might be self-deceived.  But any theory of 
self-knowledge not aiming at significant revision should predict that we generally know 
not only our attitudes, but our reasons for holding the attitudes. 
 We could know inferentially, but Byrne has not provided any inference rule that 
provides knowledge about the causal, counterfactual, or primitively evidential relations 
that hold between one’s beliefs.   BEL only leads to conclusions about what one’s beliefs 
are, not how they interact with one another.  There is, moreover, a general reason to 
think that there could not be such an inference rule, given Byrne’s existing commitments.  
Such an inference rule would need to tell us which relations one’s beliefs stand in to one 
another.  But consider what the example of the two akratics shows us.  Both akratics 
have beliefs with the same content.  But despite identical content, those beliefs stand in 
different relations to one another: the first akratic believes he will eat too much cake on 
the basis of believed inductive evidence; the second believes the inductive evidence, and 
believes he intends to eat too much, but the second belief is held “not on the basis of 
evidence,” at least if it is the type of Anscombean knowledge Byrne’s account depends 
on. 
Byrne’s inferentialist account of knowledge of intention unfortunately precludes 
any inferentialist account of knowledge of the relations of support among beliefs (and 
since on his account, knowledge of former depends on knowledge of latter, it cannot 
work).  The simple fact an agent has some set of beliefs underdetermines which relations 
hold between them, even if we restrict ourselves to very ordinary cases.  Sue, for 
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example, believes (1) All crows are black, (2) That bird is a crow and (3) That bird is black.  But 
this tells us nothing about the evidential relations holding between those beliefs.  She 
might have reasoned deductively—from (1) and (2) to (3).  She might have reasoned 
inductively to (1), with (2) and (3) jointly forming an instance supporting the 
generalization.  She might have reasoned abductively, concluding that that bird is a crow 
rather than sui generis black scavenger, in which case (1) and (3) form part of (2)’s support.  
Those relations that hold between contents—for example, that p and q jointly entail r—
also underdetermine the relations that hold between the beliefs with those contents, for 
the simple reason that neither inductive nor abductive justification tracks entailment at 
all.  But this means that one cannot reason from the relations between the contents to 
the relations of support among the beliefs: inductive and abductive reasoning don’t track 
the relations among the contents.  Nor can one reason from the presence of the attitudes 
themselves to their relations of support. 
In order to have inferentialist knowledge of the basis of one’s belief, then, one 
would presumably need to infer from a combination of one’s beliefs, and one’s 
judgments about the evidential situation (where that presents itself at least as an objective 
feature of the world—in order to respect the transparency intuition).9  I will not canvass 
possible inference rules taking both one’s beliefs and one’s assessment of one’s evidential 
situation as inputs—only note that they may get quite complicated in order to achieve 
self-verification.  For my purposes it is enough to show that if Byrne is right, and there is 
the possibility of Anscombean knowledge “not on the basis of evidence,” no such rule 
could be self-verifying, at least with respect to my beliefs about my own future actions.  
After all, that I have decisive evidence that I will φ doesn’t tell me if I believe that I will φ 
because of that evidence or because of my intention (the two akratics showed us this). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
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So, given Byrne’s commitments, knowledge of whether my belief is held on 
evidential grounds cannot be on the basis of an inference rule.  So what is the basis? 
Perhaps we know on the basis of third-personal evidence.  Remember, though, the 
question is whether I believe on the basis of evidence that I will φ.  But what about my 
behavior, or past history, or generalizations about human nature would answer that 
question for me?  It’s hard to think of anything.  It’s very hard to think of anything that 
will be present in all of the cases in which, according to common sense, I know that I 
have an intention. 
But if it isn’t inference rules, and it isn’t third-personal forms of evidence, what 
could it be, except some uniquely introspective epistemic capacity?  This would mean, 
though, that Byrne’s account completely fails to explain “self-knowledge in terms of 
epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for other subject matters.” 
Could Byrne avoid difficulty here with a different inference rule—one that 
doesn’t require the possibility of Anscombean knowledge if we’re to mind defeaters?  It’s 
possible, but finding one will be tricky.  (Ashwell 2013) suggests in passing that we could 
know our intentions on the basis of our desires, and goes on to offer an inferentialist 
account of knowledge of desires.10  But just as I sometimes must form an intention in 
cases where the reasons favor both options equally, I must sometimes form an intention 
when I am indifferent between my options.  It seems I can know what I intend in these 
cases.  An account of self-knowledge must be able to handle knowledge of those 
intentions that are to some degree arbitrary. 
 
6. The Moral? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ashwell also argues that this account is probably not economical in Byrne’s sense. 
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So transparency can’t be had for cheap.  Admittedly, plenty of its advocates have found it 
compelling enough that they are willing to pay a high price. Richard Moran argues that 
the transparency of belief and other attitudes makes self-knowledge different in kind 
from other, philosophically more familiar forms of knowledge (2001 and 2012).  In a 
recent paper, Markos Valaris argues that transparent self-knowledge is explained by a sui 
generis rational activity (2014: 10).  Lauren Ashwell (2013) offers an inferentialist account 
of the transparency of desire which she frankly admits to be incompatible with 
considerations of economy.  Of course, economy is a theoretical virtue—and if 
transparency accounts must give it up, that is a cost, even if it is compensated for 
elsewhere. 
 In any case, there is a wider moral: Byrne’s difficulties illustrate two general 
challenges transparency-based accounts must address. 
First, attitudes are not simply distinguished on the basis of their content, but also 
on the basis of how they relate (or relate the agent) to that content.  To illustrate, a belief 
can have the same content as an intention (and so the bouletic schema risked confusing 
the two).  What distinguishes the attitudes when their content is identical is how that 
content is presented: the belief as a way things are, the intention as an end or aim to be 
realized.  The challenge for the transparency theorist is to explain how we come to know 
not just the content of our thoughts, but how our thoughts are related to that content, 
despite her commitment to the transparency of one of the relata. 
The obvious answer is that you come to know (either inferentially or in some 
other way) your mental states on the basis of the other relata, the content (cf. Ashwell 
2013; and Valaris 2014).11  That may not be possible, however, with all of the relevant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Both Ashwell and Valaris argue, for example, that desires in some way present their objects as 
valuable, allowing us to know our desires by asking what is desireable.  This seems to commit them to 
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states, as we saw in the case of intention—especially intentions in cases when we are 
indifferent and judge our options equally reasonable; these must be made arbitrarily, 
which seems to mean, when there is no distinguishing feature in their content. 
 On the other hand, Byrne did distinguish perceptual states on the basis of 
content, by proposing categories of v-propositions and o-propositions and so on.  Yet 
even with the special content, the account required multiple ad hoc stipulations to avoid 
incredible predictions.  This points to a second, seemingly more difficult challenge.  
Perception relates to its content in a manner that does not commit the agent as belief does 
(cf. Schafer 2013).  I can see the lines as unequal, without accepting that they are unequal; 
but if I believe them to be unequal, that just is accepting that they are unequal. 
Byrne simply denied that perception was non-committal: seeing was literally 
believing.  This is counterintuitive, but given his commitment to transparency, well-
motivated.  For as we said, in a transparency account, the obvious way we come to know 
the specific ways our mind relates to its content is on the basis of the content itself.  But 
with non-committal states, the question is how I have access to the content, when I do 
not hold that content to be part of the world.12  Why aren’t both relata transparent (or 
simply invisible)? 
A transparency-based inferentialist account of self-knowledge actually comes at 
the price of economy.  It does so because of the difficulties of specifying, on the basis of 
those propositions to which the agent is committed, the variety of attitudes she may hold 
to that same content.  Non-committing states create further problems for it: to explain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a guise of the good position on motivation, and in the case of Ashwell, a version especially similar to that 
found in (Johnston 2001; and Oddie 2005; but also see Tenenbaum 2007; and Schafer 2013).  For 
examples of recent criticisms of such views, see (Schroeder 2008; and Baker 2014). 
12 (Valaris 2014: 15) suggests that this could perhaps be explained if perceptual states take non-
propositional content.  The suggestion is intriguing, but it would need to be developed in more detail 
before its promise could be assessed; and we would need to know if this solution could be extended 
to other plausibly non-committal states, such as, say, imagining. 
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access to the content that provides knowledge of these states, it must make 
counterintuitive claims about commitment.  Some other variety of transparency may be 
better able to solve these problems, but they are problems for which a solution must be 
given.
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